The Future of Central Banks

亚洲开发银行前副行长Lawrence GREENWOOD, Jr.

讨论嘉宾：

申银万国董事长李剑阁

华美银行董事长兼首席执行官、百人会会长Dominic NG

拉扎德银行副董事长Gary PARR

苏黎世保险集团执行委员会委员、亚太、中东董事长Geoff RIDDELL

E. L. 罗斯柴尔德公司董事长Evelyn deRothschild

中国人民银行行长周小川

http://www.xuanzang.net/a/xinwenzhongxin/2015/0527/117.html

闭门会议：玄奘文化中心秘书长、亚欧能源储备控股有限公司董事长杨云龙先生与国际金融家奥利弗·罗斯柴尔德先生、亚创联金融委主任、中资汇通投资有限公司董事长洪学天先生，高盛亚洲执行董事徐捷女士，高盛中国副总裁李欣春董事长，共同签署《全面合作协议》，组建中外合资经济体。玄奘文化中心副主任韦晓参加会议。

在中国金融四十人论坛和上海新金融研究院的牵头组织下，PIIE代表团在京沪两地陆续拜访了中国投资有限责任公司、中国证监会、中国人民银行、国家发展和改革委员会、中国社会科学院、丝路基金有限责任公司、国务院发展研究中心、财政部、上海市政府、上海证券交易所及有关决策咨询部门领导，就国际经济与贸易、国际金融与中国经济等双方关注的问题进行交流，举行了主题午餐会，并举办了第四届“CF40-PIIE中美经济学家学术交流会”。

CF40特邀嘉宾、中国人民银行行长周小川

CF40•青年论坛青年学者、中国人民银行货币政策二司汇率政策处副处长伍戈
美国麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院金融学教授王江
中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所研究员余永定
中国银行业监督管理委员会首席顾问沈联涛

CF40理事会单位代表、国家开发银行规划总监及办公厅主任郭明社

国家开发银行http://www.ksfj.org/news/fo/2012/3235.html首席经济学家黎维彬
国家开发银行http://www.ksfj.org/news/fo/2012/3235.html顾问狄卫平
国家开发银行http://www.ksfj.org/news/fo/2012/3235.html政策研究室主任李小涛
国家开发银行http://www.ksfj.org/news/fo/2012/3235.html国际金融局副局长卞士远
国家开发银行http://www.ksfj.org/news/fo/2012/3235.html国际合作业务局局长王革凡

CF40理事、中国人寿资产管理有限公司董事长缪建民

中国农业银行副行长潘功胜
北京正略钧策企业管理咨询有限公司董事长赵民
CF40学术委员、国家外汇管理局国际收支司司长管涛
中国国际金融公司首席策略师&研究部联席主管黄海洲
中国银行业监督管理委员会主席助理阎庆民
CF40成员、上海市金融服务办公室主任方星海
国务院发展研究中心对外经济研究部部长隆国强
中国证券监督管理委员会研究中心主任祁斌
北京大学国家发展研究院教授黄益平
清华大学经济管理学院金融系主任李稻葵
北京大学国家发展研究院常务副院长巫和懋
中国社会科学院金融研究所副所长殷剑峰
工银瑞信基金管理有限公司首席经济学家陈超
国务院发展研究中心金融研究所副所长巴曙松
海通国际证券集团有限公司首席经济学家胡一帆
德意志银行大中华区首席经济学家马骏
长江商学院金融学教授梅建平
CF40特邀研究员、中银国际证券董事总经理&研究部主管程漫江
瑞穗证券大中华区首席经济学家沈建光
中国农业银行首席经济学家向松祚
中国社科院世界经济与政治研究所全球宏观经济研究室主任张斌
SAC中国宏观研究主管邢自强
CF40特邀嘉宾、国家外汇管理局副局长王小奕
世界银行东亚太平洋地区首席金融专家王君
经纶国际经济研究院研究总监及资深研究员肖耿
国家发展和改革委员会财政金融司司长徐林
上海发展基金会秘书长乔依德
上海新金融研究院特邀专家
中国人民银行上海总部国际部副主任施琍娅
上海交通大学上海高级金融学院执行院长张春
上海新金融研究院创始理事
恒信金融租赁首席执行官李思明 上海新金融研究院理事会单位代表
弘毅投资上海分公司副总经理沈顺辉
兴业证券研究所首席宏观分析师王涵
主持：钱颖一 CF40学术委员会主席
主讲人：朱光耀 CF40特邀嘉宾、财政部副部长
主讲人：阎庆民 CF40常务理事、天津市人民政府副市长
主讲人：郑之杰 CF40特邀嘉宾、国家开发银行行长
主持：邹加怡 CF40特邀成员、财政部国际司司长
主讲人：李若谷 CF40常务理事、中国进出口银行原董事长
主讲人：隆国强 CF40成员、国务院发展研究中心副主任
主讲人：张燕生 CF40特邀嘉宾、国家发展与改革委员会学术委员会秘书长
主持：刘春航http://www.icij.org/offshore/china-who-uses-offshore-tax-havens CF40成员、中国银行业监督管理委员会政策研究局局长
主讲人：谢 平 CF40常务理事会副主席、中国投资有限公司副总经理
主讲人：陆 磊 CF40成员、中国人民银行研究局局长
主讲人：黄海洲 CF40成员、中国国际金融公司董事总经理
CF40成员、中信证券董事总经理高占军http://www.grand-epoch-city.com/Content/2013/12-05/1719403344.html、清华大学苏世民学者项目主任李稻葵
中国银行业监督管理委员会非银部主任李伏安
浦发银行战略发展部总经理李麟
国家开发银行http://www.ksfj.org/news/fo/2012/3235.html副行长袁力
中国银行业监督管理委员会政策研究局副局长张晓朴
北京农商银行代行长张健华
国家统计局副局长郑京平
E.L.罗斯柴尔德有限责任公司董事长伊弗林•罗斯柴尔德（Evelyn Rothschild）罗斯柴尔德有限公司执行总裁琳•罗斯柴尔德夫人
CF40-PIIE交流 | 吴敬琏与罗迪共论国企改革的市场化进程
葛  俊，中欧国际工商学院院长助理 ；中欧教育发展基金会秘书长
华邦嵩，惠生工程（中国）有限公司总裁
季卫东，上海交通大学凯原法学院院长
李华轮，上海朱雀投资发展中心执行事务合伙人兼总经理
刘胜军，中欧陆家嘴国际金融研究院执行副院长
裘国根，上海重阳投资管理有限公司董事长兼首席投资官
孙立坚，复旦大学经济学院副院长
童之伟，中国宪法学研究会副会长、华东政法大学宪法学教授
王广宇，金陵华软基金总裁
韦  森，复旦大学经济学教授
吴敬琏，中欧国际工商学院宝钢经济学教席教授
吴晓灵，全国人大常委、财经委副主任委员；中欧陆家嘴国际金融研究院院长
肖  耿，香港经纶国际经济研究院研究总监及资深研究员
许  斌，中欧国际工商学院副教务长、经济学与金融学教授
许思涛，经济学人集团中国首席代表
许小年，中欧国际工商学院西班牙国际银行经济学与金融学教席教授
张  春，上海高级金融学院执行院长
张  军，复旦大学中国经济研究中心主任
赵丹阳，赤子之心中国成长投资基金创始人
朱  宁，上海高级金融学院副院长
朱晓明，中欧国际工商学院院长、中欧陆家嘴国际金融研究院理事长
朱  阳，上海欧擎资产管理集团董事长
Adam Posen，彼得森国际经济研究所所长
Axel Leijonhufvud, 洛杉矶加州大学（UCLA）名誉教授、意大利特伦托大学教授
Daniel Rosen，彼得森国际经济研究所访问研究员
David Stockton，彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员
Evelyn Rothschild，伊夫林•罗斯柴尔德爵士，E.L.Rothschild主席及ERANDA Foundation主席
Jacob Kirkegaard，彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员
Jeff Schott，彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员
Lynn Rothschild，琳•罗斯柴尔德，E.L. Rothschild LLC总裁
Michael Dicks，瓦德瓦尼资产管理公司(Wadhwani AssetManagement)经济学家，前巴克莱(Barclay)资产管理公司首席经济学家
Nicholas Borst，彼得森国际经济研究所副研究员
Nicholas Lardy，彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员
Nicolas Veron，彼得森国际经济研究所访问研究员
Richard Cooper，彼得森国际经济研究所荣誉主席、哈佛大学顾问委员会委员
Ryan Rutkowski，彼得森国际经济研究所研究分析师


二戰期間，國際清算銀行形同德國國家銀行的分行，接受納粹掠奪來的黃金，為納粹德國進行外匯交易，成為同盟國及軸心國的秘密接觸管道。

在過去的半個多世紀以來，國際清算銀行從調和貨幣匯率，到二○○二年推出歐元，一直提供必要的技術和行政支援。如今，它又位居打造全球金融和監理架構的中心，凡有經濟危機，國際清算銀行無不扮演樞紐角色。

1949年，10月1日，毛澤東在北京的天安門廣場宣佈中華人民共和國成立。他是由羅斯柴爾德家族在俄羅斯創建的共產主義所資助，而且一直由羅斯柴爾德的代理們所跟進，這些人就是，所羅門⋄阿德勒 ，他是合眾國的前財政部官員，他是一個蘇聯間諜；以色列⋄埃普斯坦，一個試圖在發動革命而被沙皇投入監獄的猶太人布爾什維克的兒子；和弗蘭克⋄柯伊，他是由羅斯柴爾德擁有的國際貨幣基金（組織）的領銜官員。

罗斯柴尔德家族史740-1818

罗斯柴尔德家族史1821-1875

罗斯柴尔德家族史1878-1919

罗斯柴尔德家族史1920-1935

罗斯柴尔德家族史1936-1948

罗斯柴尔德家族史1949-1973

罗斯柴尔德家族史1974-1990

罗斯柴尔德家族史1991-1997

罗斯柴尔德家族史1998-2002

罗斯柴尔德家族史2003-2006

55岁泰康老总陈东升已娶毛泽东外孙女 曾苦恋15年http://finance.ifeng.com/news/people/20121012/7140273.shtml

中国丝路基金有限责任公司注册资本615.25亿元人民币http://www.nanzao.com/sc/national/14c317175537dc8/si-lu-ji-jin-zhu-ce-zi-ben-615-yi-jin-qi-ling-xian-hao-hua-gao-guan-zhen-rong（董事长为央行行长助理金琦，其他董事来自国家发改委、财政部、外交部、商务部、外管局、中投公司、国开行、进出口银行等部门）

大连万达集团董事长、内地首富王健林进行了长达一年资产调查，结果发现万达上市前的早期投资者中，包括现任主席习近平、时任主席的胡锦涛、时任总理的温家宝、前全国政协主席贾庆林、前全国人大副委员长王兆国的亲属或其亲属的商业伙伴。

潘永斌被列为北京一家公司的唯一股东，该公司于2007年向大连合兴投资了约16万美元，王健林用大连合兴作为自己企业的主要持股公司。潘永斌的公司提交给政府以及在线数据库的记录都对公众开放，记录显示，公司地址在北京市中心标志性的、巧克力色的中信国际大厦的顶层。乘电梯上去，就进了北京昭德投资有限公司的大理石铺地的大堂，公司董事长李伯潭是原中共中央政治局常委贾庆林的女婿。

阿里巴巴并未详细说明这些投资公司拥有的深厚的政治背景。它们分别是：新天域，博裕资本、中信资本，以及国家开发银行的投资机构国开金融(CDB Capital)http://cn.nytimes.com/business/20140721/c21alibaba/

Wuhu officials bypassed the central government for approval of their pioneering plan,turning to the local People’s Congress—China’s answer to a town council—for approval.The city was greatly aided by Chen’s prestige.As Chen and the Wuhu officials saw it,they were creating a virtuous cycle.Public works like roads would boost home prices,which in turn would boost land prices.Higher land prices would mean more local government income,hence more spending.

CDB built Wuhu Construction into a giant;eventually its assets grew from 319 million to 21.4 billion yuan,and it bought equity stakes in 21 local companies, including Chery, which is now using CDB backing to expand into every corner of the developing world,from Africa to Latin America.“From then on,the Wuhu Model was extensively applied across the country,” the bank’s official history says,boosting urbanization,leaving a“precious legacy in the field of financing for urban infrastructure construction.”But what on earth had it started?CDB’slending to local governments did not crowd out other lenders of capital,as some say state-owned development banks can do.Instead,it sucked them all in.The model’ssuccess in Wuhu was replicated across the country,with CDB lending money to LGFVs in Shanghai(home to former president JiangZemin)and Tianjin (home to Premier WenJiabao)as well as the canal city of Suzhou.

One item few prospectuses omit:homage to CDB.Tianjin Binhai Construction and Investment Group,which was set up in 2005 in an agreement between the city and CDB,said it“relied on CDB from the outset.”Huainan Urban Construction Investment Co.in Anhui,which  won a 7.1 billion yuan loan from CDB at the beginning of 2008,said it relied on CDB loans to finance most of its projects.In Jiamusi,an Amur River city near the Russian border in Heilongjiang,a 2010 prospectus  bragged that the local investment company,Jiamusi New Era Infrastructure Construction Investment Group Co.,was“among the top 100 cities that get CDB support.” In the South,on the border with Myanmar,Yunnan Highway Development Investment Co.—more on them later—was created in 2006 through an agreement with CDB.

While Zhu Rongji’s 1994 reforms centralized tax collection,they  perversely allowed local governments greater control over the usage rights of land,allowing them to keep all land-leasing revenues.This growing,valuable state-owned resource was now totally in the hands of local governments,and they had no obligation to publish their budgets to the public.

The inequality in some cases has led to violence,far away from the confines of the state-banking system.That was certainly the case in Fuzhou,a city in JiangxiProvince,just to the east of Hunan.There,a land dispute with the government was central to a May 2011 bombing that killed three  people.Qian Mingqi allegedly set off three blasts at or near government buildings in the city amid a dispute over compensation he had been offered in a resettlement,according to reports by the official Xinhua News Agency.Qian died in one of the explosions. He had been asking for more compensation after being resettled in 2002 to make way for a highway. Three months before the bombings,Fuzhou’s investment vehicle went to the country’s bond market for the first time,raising 800 million  yuan.In its prospectus,in which it said it received CDB loans,the company said its main business included construction,land development,and“resettlement.”

The key was that Tianjin could use 15 years of land usage rights sales to secure the loan,both to act as collateral and as a source to pay back the funds.The city also had to promise to use its own infrastructure fund to pay back the money if land sales ran into difficulties.The bankers forecast that the land sales income would increase every year by 10 percent. That turned out to be a conservative bet:In reality,the income increased by 20 percent.By 2006,land income was 10.3 billion yuan,up from 2.4 billion yuan in 2004.By 2009,it was a different story:China Index Academy estimated the city’s land sales revenue was 73.2 billion yuan,a 67 percent increase over 2008.

While the out break of severe acute respiratory syndrome(SARS) in  2003 in Beijing intervened and prevented Chen Yuan from visiting  Tianjin to sign the deal,it was eventually signed in June of that year.The  original loan contract was signed with the city’s land bank;in 2004, the city set up an LGFV with four subsidiaries to handle the different  projects,including two subway lines,greening of the city,and riverside infrastructure development.The importance of land as collateral acted in the same way that CDB would use oil overseas in Africa and Asia.The  income from the subway,the book notes,only needed to cover operating costs;it doesn’t need to pay back the loan.The money to pay back the loan for all the projects will nearly all come from government income from selling land rights.The investment that CDB started helped bring in the property developers,too:The riverside construction project saw 10 billion yuan of investment in infrastructure but drew a total of 80 or more billion yuan of property construction,according to the book. Yet there’s a point where ambition and enthusiasm becomes recklessness and hubris,and Tianjin may have crossed that line.There’s no better place to witness the physical manifestation of hubris than Yu jiapu, Tianjin’s planned Manhattan.

Xu says the buildings in Yu jiapu are all being occupied by stateowned companies,including a steel company and a mining company turned realestate developer that is putting the finishing touches on Tianjin’s answer to Rockefeller Center.Asked if any private companies were setting up shop there,she pointed to a hotel.A giant billboard in Conch City—red background with white characters—quotes Chinese president Hu Jintao,who visited the area in April 2011,as saying“Put all your strength into storming the fort to win the battle of developing and opening the Binhai NewArea,work hard to become the lead soldiers in the battle to realize scientific development.”Not words you’d find in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. 

To build Yu jiapu,Tianjin officials are piling onto borrowing that was already half a trillion yuan by the end of 2011—equivalent to half the annual per-capita income of the city’s 13 million people.More than 5,000 people were moved out of the area starting in 2008 to make way for the project,among the millions nationwide evicted from homes to make way for China’s urbanization projects.Tianjin  Binhai New Area Construction&Investment Group Co.sold 10 billion yuan worth of bonds in December 2011,earmarking 1 billion yuan from  the sale to fund the construction of the district’s transport hub,which includes a high-speed rail line that will cut travel time to Beijing to 45 minutes.In the first half of that year,its debt,mostly from bank loans and led by CDB,rose 11.9 percent from the end of 2010 to 71 billion yuan, according to a bond prospectus.To finish all the projects,more money is needed,said Tianjin’s vice mayor,Cui Jindu.

CDB’s lending to local governments stems from the failure of Zhu Rongji’s 1994 reforms ,which left local government swith huge spending burdens —everything from providing water to roads—but no  way to raise funds apart from leasing out state land.The prohibition set on borrowing by local governments was a rule observed only in the breach,just pushing the borrowing off the budget and into the arms of the state banks.Without any transparency,and with all of the capital from the state-owned banks rather than private institutions,the market has added no discipline.In one case,a Shanghai LGFV (Local Government Financing Vehicles )borrowed 2 billion yuan of loans for a high-speed railway project,but ended up using half the money for property projects.After the experience of the late 1990s,when many local government and state-owned enterprise loans were bailed out,the commercial banks were supposed to look after themselves,yet many of the projects they piled into led by CDB had poor returns.

There was a fundamental mismatch:The debts and the companies themselves were left off local government balance sheets,even as investors,banks,and ratings companies viewed them as having the implicit guarantee of local governments.Today,the LGFV's (Local Government Financing Vehicles )have dozens of subsidiaries,cross-holdings,and cross-guarantees,making it impossible to tell how much one local government is on the hook for if one linkin the chain is broken.Some LGFVs(Local Government Financing Vehicles ) have also turned into lenders,passing on money to property companies.While China wanted the institutions and infrastructure of a bond market,at the same time as it expanded, banks did their best to hollow out the integrity and effectiveness of those same institutions.Ratings agencies gave bonds sold by local government backed companies high ratings because they believed in the implicit back stop of the local government;investors took the yield as free money.At least the ratings agencies themselves were self-conscious enough to recognize the self-destructive behavior.“Who ever gives them the better rating gets the business,”Dagong’s fiery chairman,Guan Jiangzhong,told us.“This is very dangerous.”

While there is no way of telling what assets CDB was left with,the experience of cities like Chongqing,where GDP growth was16.4percent in 2011,showed that for all its problems,there is sheer genius behind the model.Chen Yuan of CDB had realized in 1998,before other banks, the force of urbanization and its role in economic growth.China long ago decided that the key to GDP growth is boosting productivity,and few economic events boost the productivity of a populace than moving them from life on a farm to life in the city.And that’s exactly what happened in Dawu village to Li Liguang.

The reliance on LGFVs(Local Government Financing Vehicles )  has also created one of the world’s biggest property bubbles:Nation wide,housing prices in China have risen at least by 140 percent since 1998.And unlike the welfare,health,and pension expenses that have crippled Europe,China’s forced urbanization has left a lot of debt before it even begins to deal with these expenses.By 2011, Standard Chartered was predicting that China’s debt levels were in reality around 71 percent of its 2010 GDP,approaching US levels.No one knew how far the debt extended,who else had lent to the companies,and who was liable.There was only one way that China would pay for this debt,and that would be through China’s savers,through higher tax,or through more inflation.